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Abstract:  
 
The economic constitutions of Germany and Greece have resulted in the post-war period in 
two economies that are based on two vastly different philosophies.  
 
Germany has built a highly competitive, outward looking economy based essentially on the 
principles of the so-called “Social Market Economy”, whereas Greece has set up a “state-
managed economy” by drawing on the principles of central planning and administrative 
controls.  
 
This divide is equally stark, if assessed on the basis of the performance of the two economies. 
For, as it is known by now, Germany has become once again the powerhouse of Europe 
while Greece has gone bankrupt.  
 
As to the implications of this great divide for the future of the EU, its identification and map-
ping helps understand why convergence criteria on the basis of economic performance and 
living standards should be abandoned in favour of criteria based on the widening and deep-
ening of the four European freedoms.  
 
A multispeed Euroland enmeshed in these freedoms is going to be more democratic, more 
cohesive and a much happier union for the European citizens to call homeland.     
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1. Introduction2 
 
The visionaries who embarked in the 1950s on the monumental project of Europe-
an unification aimed initially at economic integration. They envisioned that efforts 
towards this objective would evolve in three stages. In the first stage, the member-
states would join in a customs union, eliminating all trade and non-trade barriers 
among them. Then, upon sufficient progress, a second stage would follow in which 
efforts would turn to forming an economic union. At this stage market institutions 
and functions would be merged across all member-states so that a common pro-
duction, distribution and exchange economy would emerge based on four princi-
ples, i.e., uninhibited mobility of goods, services, capital, and workers. Finally, in 
the third stage, the member-states would abolish their national currencies and join 
in a monetary union. Throughout these stages all arrangements would be negotiat-
ed well in advance and every country that joined would be committed to adjust its 
economic policies accordingly. For them as founding fathers the  expectation was 
that at the end of this long process, and in the light of the results that would have 
been achieved, the economic bonds among member-states would have grown 
strong enough to withstand the difficulties that any attempt at political integration 
would entail.  
 
Following the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957 and over the next several dec-
ades the prospects of European unification kept improving. Many European coun-
tries sought and joined initially the European Economic Community (EEC), later on 
became full members of the European Union (EU), and in the 1990s entered into the 
European Monetary Union (EMU) by adopting the Euro as their single national cur-
rency. Every time major hurdles arose in the negotiations over various thorny issues, 
member-states showed exemplary good will in working out compromises; and 
whenever decisions involved transferring of powers from the periphery to the centre, 
a strong spirit of unification enabled member-states to surpass whatever nationalistic 
and idiosyncratic objections they might have. In short, the progress was intermittent 
and reflected not only the benefits of member-states from the synergies of economic 
integration but also other long term strategic advantages associated with the building 
of a major union-state with global presence and ambitions along with the other su-
per-powers in the world.  
 
However, more recently, and particularly since the 2008 financial crisis in the U.S, 
which spread quickly to several member-states and revealed many fragile arrange-
                                                     
2 I am indebted to several friends and colleagues who read this paper and offered me their 
advice. From among them I wish to single out George Tridimas and Spyridon Par-
askevopoulos for their valuable comments and suggestions. Also, Constantinos Christidis 
read the text and drew my attention to certain linguistic obscurities. To them and to the 
others who helped me improve the paper in one way or another, I express my thanks and 
sincere appreciation. Needless to say I remain solely responsible for any remaining errors 
of fact or interpretation.   
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ments in the functional and institutional structure of EU, the prospects of European 
unification turned sour and pessimism started to mount. As a result, experts and 
common people who had been previously excited with the possibility of a United 
States of Europe in the distant future now find themselves at a loss and put the 
blame on various causes. Some, for example, hold responsible the bureaucracy in 
Brussels for the difficulties they are creating in the everyday lives of European 
citizens through their bias towards overregulation.3 Some others point to the fail-
ure of central EU authorities to deal promptly and effectively with events like the 
debt crisis in the countries of the Mediterranean South and the influx of illegal 
immigrants and refugees from poor and war torn countries of Asia and Africa. Still 
some others blame the loss of representativeness on the part of the European 
Commission (EC), which in their view has come under the control and influence 
of Germany. To be sure, depending on one’s personal dispositions and infor-
mation, one may find more or less merits in these criticisms. But integration was 
accompanied always by arrangements that required compromises, at times painful 
from a national point of view, and yet staying the course in the process of Europe-
an unification was never in doubt, at least not until the decision last year by the 
United Kingdom to leave and the emergence of populist political parties, which 
seek election on closed economy and leave from EU platforms.  
 
At this juncture the results from last year’s elections in France are encouraging. 
Hopefully, no other major EU member-state will leave and the centrifugal effects 
from the departure of the United Kingdom may fade away soon. Yet these difficul-
ties should not deter the study of the problems that hinder EU from making progress 
in the front of unification. The present paper is motivated exactly by this spirit.  In 
particular, it focuses on two member-states, i.e. Germany and Greece, in pursue of 
three objectives: To identify the fundamental differences in their institutional and 
organizational structure; to assess the extent to which these differences have con-
tributed to the spectacular differences in their performance, and lastly, to map the 
implications of the findings for the European project. For, if the same differences 
hold more generally among advancing and lagging member-states, the European 
project may come to a standstill, if not completely abandoned due to growing divi-
sions and disparities.  
 
From the contrast of their present circumstances it emerges that between Germany and 
Greece there is a divide which is as great as that which differentiates the “liberal” from 
the “statist” ideas and approaches to democracy and market economy. In the post-war 
period, Germany adopted the former and reached new and sustainable highs in 
world power and material well-being, whereas Greece adopted the latter and after 
                                                     
3 This charge, frequently stressed in the British press, is reminiscent of the sharp criticisms 
Thatcher, late prime minister of the United Kingdom, systematically addressed in the 1980s 
at the central administrative authorities in Brussels. It has received support by authors like 
Siedentop (2001). However, forceful and convincing counterarguments abound. For exam-
ple, see Moravscik (2001). 
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two decades (1954-1974) of remarkable state-driven economic growth and subse-
quently four decades of decline (1975-2009), in 2010 it went bankrupt.4 These 
results support the superiority of the liberal over the statist model and, in con-
junction with the evidence that the institutional arrangements in France and the 
other countries of the European south are more or less statist,  they imply that 
unification is threatened more by the differences over issues of democracy and 
economy rather than differences in per capita income or other welfare and cul-
tural indices.5 Hence, on this ground, it is concluded that the ultimate test is 
whether these member-states will be willing or not in the coming years to 
streamline their political and economic institutions along lines, at least as liberal6 
as those prevailing currently in Germany. If not, which is more likely, the Euro-
pean project in its present form will be abandoned and the aspirations for unifi-
cation will shrink to include only those Northern member–states with rather lib-
eral orders of institutions and organization.  
 
The presentation in Section 2 immediately below starts with a brief flashback into 
the ideas and approaches to issues of democracy and economy that prevailed in 
Germany and Greece in the post-war period. Since it is these that shaped their insti-
tutional arrangements, this flashback should facilitate interested readers in under-
standing the roots of the enormous differences in the directions Germany and Greece 
chose to follow regarding their political and economic organization. In Sections 3 and 
4 the focus turns on the principles that underlie and the structure that characterizes the 
German and the Greek model of market economy. Of these two models, the latter is 
unknown to foreign audiences. For this reason the emphasis of the presentation is on 
the ideas and principles on which it stands as well as the structure of its building 
blocks. But in general the effort in these sections is to hold them short in order to keep 
the length of the paper within reasonable bounds.  Lastly, Section 5 identifies and as-
sesses the differences between the two models; and Section 6 closes with a summary 
of the findings and the conclusions.  
 
                                                     
4 Tables 1 and 2 in the Appendix provide two sets of indicators that highlight the vast dif-
ferences among Greece and Germany in terms of living standards and working condi-
tions, on the one hand, and the quality of institutions and governance, on the other. The 
point this paper aspires to make is that these differences have grown wider over recent 
decades because of the differences in the social and economic organization of the two 
countries.  
5 For an enlightened assessment of fundamental differences emanating from these sources 
that result in the weakening of the bonds of solidarity among European peoples, see also 
Habermas (2018). 
6 In 2008, i.e. the year before the economic crisis erupted in Greece, public spending in 
Germany and Greece was 43.6% and 50.8% of GDP, respectively. Hence, on this basis, 
Germany was nearly as statist as Greece. But on numerous other criteria, Germany has 
been generally a much-much “freer” country. Hence, the terms “liberal” and “statist” are 
used somewhat loosely to signify the wide differences between the two countries on the ba-
sis of an overall index of freedom from state intervention.  
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2. On the evolution of ideas and policies in Germany and Greece  
 
In the aftermath of the 1929 crisis, certain economists and politicians in Germany 
and Greece were thinking hard about the reforms that ought to be adopted in order to 
bring the political and economic organization in their countries into alignment with the 
thorny problems they faced. Before WWII started in 1940 their ideas and proposals 
received scant attention. But they came to a heading during the war and shortly after. 
In retrospect, it turns out that over the period from about 1935 to 1950 a battle of ideas 
took place, the outcome of which determined in each country the shape of institutions 
and the direction of social and economic policies until about 1970. Around that time 
the intellectual and political environment in both countries changed in favour of more 
interventionist policies, thus leading to the differences in their present institutional and 
organizational structures. The focus below is on the protagonists and the ideas that 
were debated in the two periods and what the outcomes were. By undertaking this 
brief flashback, the objective is to place the shifts in each country in the context of the 
historical circumstances in which they took place so as to enable the readers to relate 
the ideas and policies to the results. 
 
2.1 The Protagonists and their Influence in Germany7  
 
In the aftermath of World War I the structure of the German economy continued to 
become more and more concentrated with the formation across all sectors of mo-
nopolies, cartels and other types of business agglomerations of economic power. 
According to Barry (2013, 2), concentration had advanced to such an extent that, 
when in the early 1930s Hitler laid down his plans for building the German war ma-
chine, he did not need to nationalize anything.8  Under these circumstances it is not 
surprising that freedom loving academics would take the lead in developing and 
disseminating ideas and proposals for the next day, i.e. when freedom would return. 
Thus, in the mid-1930s emerged a group of distinguished thinkers, some based in the 
University of Freiburg and led by Walter Eucken, Franz Böhm and Fritz Meyer (the 
Freiburg group), and some based abroad and led by Wilhelm Röpke, Alfred Müller-
Armack and Alexander Rüstow (the group of so-called “exiles”), who presented a 
                                                     
7 For a brief, lucid and highly informative account of the intellectual and business climate 
that prevailed in Germany in the decades leading to the 1948 break with the past in policy 
thinking, see Hasse (2017). 
8 Additionally it should be noted that the advanced concentration in the German economy 
during the early decades of the 20th century was encouraged by the prevailing intellectual 
and social climate. For example, in the 1920s the so-called “Socialists of the chair” and 
the younger adherents of the Historical School of Economics  argued in favor of deep in-
tervention by the state into the economy to confront the problems of unemployment, infla-
tion and deficits in the balance of payments. On the other hand, the existence of very strong 
socialist parties suggests that large majorities of Germans sought state paternalism. As a 
result, it is said, jointly these conditions opened the door to the defeat of the Weimar Re-
public and the rise of Hitler to dictatorship. 
G.C. Bitros 
  
19  
new strain of liberalism known as “Ordo-liberalism”, “liberalism of the rules”, or 
“Social Market Economy”.  
 
They founded it on three pillars. First, by rejecting the fundamental precept of “clas-
sical liberalism” (according to which, if the size of the state is small, thus leaving the 
social and economic processes mainly to themselves), in a democracy the self-
coordinating forces in society and economy bring about results that cannot be im-
proved without reducing individual freedoms and efficiency in the use of productive 
resources. Second, by asserting that before these optimal results might take effect, 
uninhibited freedom beyond the laws for protecting natural rights would destroy 
freedom itself. For in that event, they claimed, unconstrained contracting in the 
framework of voluntary exchanges would lead to monopolies, cartels and other con-
centrations of economic power; without careful design, governments would be cap-
tured by organized interest groups; and, in general, a small government restrained 
from intervening to streamline market forces would be unable to maintain order, jus-
tice, predictability and ultimate the market system itself; And thirdly, by laying down 
the principles for establishing an Ordoliberal regime in real life.  
   
Their key idea in this regard was that, aside from the political constitution that 
aims to restrain the powers of the state to protect civil liberties, there would be 
another constitution which would prescribe rules under which the state would be 
restrained to intervene in the economy to protect economic freedoms. Hence, since 
how liberal the emerging regime would be depends on the provisions in this so-
called “economic constitution”, the debate turned on the breadth and depth of state 
intervention. This is exactly where the two groups split. According to Vanberg 
(2004, 2), the Freiburg group maintained that: (a) the market as a non-
discriminating, privilege-free system of competition, is in and by itself an ethical 
system, and (b) it can and should be combined with a system of minimal income 
guarantee for those who are temporarily or permanently unable to earn a living 
through the market. On the contrary, the group of exiles proposed that: (a) the 
market is a “technical instrument” that can be used by society to produce wealth, 
yet it does not make itself for a “good” society, and hence (b) it should be supple-
mented by “social provisions” that are supposed to make the market economy - 
beyond its economic efficiency - ethically appealing. From this account of their 
differences it follows that Eucken and his followers argued in favour of a relative-
ly small state with limited powers to intervene in the economy, whereas Müller-
Armack and those who followed him supported a relatively larger state with wider 
powers of intervention.  
 
Immersed in these ideas, particularly those of the Freiburg group, was Ludwig Er-
hard who was destined after the war to play an instrumental role in their translation 
to actual policies for speeding up reconstruction in the then West-Germany.9 Thus, 
                                                     
9 According to Baum (1990, 178) Erhard precluded adopting the Scandinavian model. He 
considered it too statist and conducive to undermining individual responsibility, which he 
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soon after he was elected director of economics by the Bizonal Economic Council in 
1948 and Minister of Finance in the government of Conrad Adenauer in 1949, he 
embarked on a far-reaching liberalization program, scrapping all price controls, in-
troducing the Deutschmark as new currency, establishing the Bundesbank as an in-
dependent monetary authority, etc., and leaving the markets to operate freely. We 
know that he did so by conviction not only because he went against the plethora of 
German supporters of hard core statist and Keynesian policies,10 but also because, 
according to Barry (1993, 9), he ignored all warnings from the American administra-
tion of allied forces who, drawing on the advice of such eminent economists as John 
Galbraith, were determined that West Germany should not have a liberal market 
economy. What all these adversaries predicted was that Erhard’s Ordoliberal poli-
cies would lead to high inflation, deceleration of investment and high unemploy-
ment. Yet all their predictions proved wrong and by 1960 the West German econo-
my had performed beyond any expectations.11 
 
After 1960 the grip of Ordoliberal politicians and academics on the developments 
started gradually to wane. Due mainly to the newly accumulated wealth and the in-
creasing distance from the halcyon 1945-1948 days, the importance of limited gov-
ernment intervention that had been impressed in the minds of Germans diminished, 
whereas Keynesian and Central Planning inspired academics and politicians stirred 
the demand for more and more government interventions in pursue of such objec-
tives as controlling the business cycle, stimulating growth, stabilizing prices, main-
taining full employment, building a more equitable society, etc.12 According to Rit-
tershausen (2007, 43), by 1966 popular support for Keynesian policies was such that 
Ludwig Erhard who was Chancellor at the time: 
 
“… was forced to consider some sort of Konjuncturpolitik and the gen-
eral coordination of economic policy. Even after his Social Market 
                                                                                                                                         
thought was absolutely necessary for the speedy recovery and the future of Germany in the 
long run.  
10  Rittershausen (2007, 20-38) provides a very detailed account of the battle among various 
groups from politics, academia and labor unions, as well as the proposals they submitted in 
the critical period 1945-1948. 
11 There is a voluminous body of literature that attributes much of the so-called “German 
miracle” of 1952-1960 to reasons other than the policies adopted under the model of So-
cial Market Economy. For an extended review of this literature, see for example Van Hook 
(2004). However, given the tectonic shifts that took place in policy thinking in 1948 under 
Ludwig Erhard, it would be farfetched to surmise that this decisive departure from the so-
cialist prewar regime did not contribute significantly to the rates and sustainability of 
Germany’s postwar progress.       
12 The evidence assembled by Rittershausen (2007, 31-38) points convincingly towards the 
assessment that the two economists who spearheaded the intellectual shift in academia and 
politics towards this direction were Karl Schiller and Erich Preiser. However, note that 
according to Hasse (2017, 100), both of them as scholars and policy designers and practi-
tioners are classified as “creators and performers of the Social Market Economy.”  
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Economy aura was irreparably breached by recession, Erhard’s pro-
posals remained half-hearted attempts to stave off an increasingly 
Keynesian-leaning electorate.” 
 
Finally, the triumph of Keynesianism over Ordoliberalism was recognized officially 
in May 1967 with the passage of the Law for the Promotion of Economic Stability 
and Growth, which gave federal policymakers wide discretionary authority not just 
to conduct demand management policies but to use fiscal and other policy means of 
intervene deep into the economy.  
 
In the years since then many authors have assessed the results of the policies and the 
institutional arrangements that were put in place under the above law and its numer-
ous amendments in the same spirit. For example, Giersch et al. (1994) found that the 
interventionist ideas and policies during the period 1960-1989 not only failed to 
realize most of the objectives for which they had been adopted, but also that they 
gave rise to major supply-side problems and to a significant expansion in the gov-
ernment sector. However, nothing helped more in stemming, if not reversing, the 
tide of interventionism in Germany than two powerful developments that took hold 
since the early 1980s. The first of them is the victory of liberal ideas and policies 
over Keynesianism, particularly in the U.K and the U.S. Slowly but surely the elec-
tion of Margaret Thatcher in the U.K. in 1979 and Ronald Reagan in the U.S. in 
1981, both of whom won on platforms based on the teachings and writings of such 
great philosophers and economists like Friedrich A. Hayek13 and Milton Friedman, 
gave impetus to “pro-market”, “pro-deregulation” and “pro-roll-back-the-state” poli-
cies around the world and changed the balance of dominance in academia in favour of 
the called “neo-liberal” thinking. Germany did not remain immune to these shifts and 
the fact that in the present German Council of Economic Experts only one out of five 
members is seen as Keynesian attests to the conclusion that interventionism has been 
in long term retreat.  
 
The second development has to do with the act for the Single European Market in 
1986. This was the first major revision of the 1957 Treaty of Rome and it set the 
European Community on a path to establishing a single market based on four free-
doms, i.e. free and uninhibited movement of goods, capital, services, and people. 
But these freedoms are embedded as an integral part in the ideas and policies 
Ordoliberals have been adhering all along. Did Ordoliberalism re-enter Germany 
from the back-door of EU? The answer is in the affirmative and it is amply high-
lighted by the interesting details reported by Hasse (2017). From them we learn that 
the head of the German delegation in the negotiations for the Treaty of Rome was 
Alfred Müller-Armack, who served at the time under Ludwig Erhard as Deputy Minis-
ter in the Ministry of Economics and in charge for all European Economic Affairs. 
                                                     
13  Hayek has been among the intellectual progenitors of the Social Market Economy. To get 
a glimpse into his relationship with other members in the Freiburg group and the group of 
the exiles, see Hasse et al. (2008, 40-42). 
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Accordingly, given his strong liberal convictions as well as those that prevailed among 
the members of the German delegation, it is hardly surprising that the Treaty of Rome 
bears the imprint of Ordoliberals and that its revision in 1986 expanded and deepened 
the provisions for the realization of the four freedoms across all EU member-states.14  
 
To conclude, since the 1980s the dominant coalition of Keynesian and other inter-
ventionists in Germany came under attack from two main directions. That is, first, 
from the international shift towards “neo-liberal” ideas and policies, and, second, 
from the Ordoliberal requirements as mandated from the treaty for the Single Euro-
pean Market. As a result, even though in the meantime Germany transformed into an 
advanced “Welfare state” with all the rigidities and inefficiencies associated with 
it,15   to a great extent it has grown into a liberal democracy and economy.  
 
2.2 The Protagonists and their Influence in Greece 
 
As happened in Germany in the early decades of the 20th century, the ideas of classi-
cal economists regarding the role of the state in the economy retreated also in 
Greece. But unlike Germany, where Ordoliberalism started to take roots in the in-
terwar years, during the same period in Greece the intellectual and policy climate 
was predominantly in favour of economic planning and large-scale state interven-
tions in the economy. As a result in the late 1940s this divergence led to an Ordolib-
eral economy in Germany versus a state-managed economy in Greece. Since then, 
after several decades of decline, Ordoliberalism in Germany has been enjoying a re-
vival by riding on the back of neoliberal ideas and the four freedoms of the Single 
European Market, whereas the model of state-managed economy in Greece has veered 
all the time towards state socialism, despite all expectations that within EU this trend 
would be reversed. Having outlined above how shifts in ideas influenced these trends 
in Germany, the objective here is to do the same in the case of Greece.   
   
According to Hatzivassiliou (2010, 3-5), the academics, academics-turn-politicians 
and politicians who contributed with their ideas and initiatives to the regime that was 
established in Greece in the late 1940s may be classified largely into three groups. The 
first was led by Panayiotis Kanellopoulos, the second by George Papandreou, and the 
third by the duo of Xenophon Zolotas and Constantinos Tsatsos.16 All three groups 
                                                     
14 That this is the case can be ascertained also by reference to the ample evidence that the 
policies of the European Commission frequently conflict with statist and interventionist 
policies pursued by German governments. For an interesting case to this effect, see Smith 
(2001). 
15  In support of this view, see also footnote 2. 
16  Certain literature suggests that the ideas to which leaders are exposed in their university 
studies determine to some extent the nature of policies they sponsor later when in public 
office. If so, it may be of interest to note that Kanellopoulos and Tsatsos graduated from the 
University of Heidelberg, Zolotas from the University of Leipzig, and Papandreou from the 
Humboldt University of Berlin. The ideas that held sway in these and other German univer-
sities at the time were those of the historical school and the school of state socialism. 
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supported highly interventionist reforms. But differences of emphasis and degree in 
the particular policies, as well as in the approaches for their implementation, prevented 
them from finding common ground. So when at some point or another they evolved 
into separate political parties, they were very small to gain any traction with the elec-
torate. To highlight the gist of what they proposed and given that the third group com-
prised people who influenced developments well into the 1980s,17 in Bitros and 
Karayiannis (2011) we focused mainly on the views that Zolotas and Tsatsos ex-
pounded. Not surprisingly we found evidence suggesting beyond reasonable doubt 
that what they proposed was the establishment of an advanced regime of state social-
ism along the lines that had been propagated by contemporary socialist authors.  
 
Had communists won in the civil war, most likely some version of the economic and 
social organization envisaged by Zolotas in 1943 and of the constitution that Tsatsos 
had drafted shortly thereafter would have been imposed and Greece would have turned 
into a communist state.18 From Tomai (2011) and others we know that this develop-
ment did not materialized because, when the WWII ended and the allies decided that it 
was time to change the course of events in Greece, the balance of the debate between 
the above mentioned reformists and the officials of the American Mission for Aid to 
Greece (AMAG) regarding the country’s institutional and organizational setup shifted 
in favour of less socialist alternatives.   
 
This assessment differs materially from that arrived by other distinguished scholars. 
For example, summarizing his findings, Hatzivassiliou (2010, 1) concludes that: 
 
“Since the mid-1930s, members of an indigenous reformist movement had 
advocated principles of political, social, and economic reform similar to 
those promoted by Washington through the European Recovery Program 
(ERP) beginning in 1947–1948. These   reformist plans had been buried 
under the weight of the country’s polarization and the subsequent civil 
strife. The Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan were instrumental in reviv-
ing the dynamism of these domestic reformist forces which would shape 
the country’s development in the ensuing decades. 
  
The difference lies in that the reforms the Americans promoted in Greece under the 
European Recovery Program (ERP) were fundamentally of a Keynesian bent and 
                                                                                                                                         
Hence, given that the political platforms of all three groups called for a systematic inter-
vention of the state in the economy as a means of rationalizing the economic, social, and 
political life of the country, it is rather unlikely that the German intellectual connection of 
these Greek leaders did not play a pivotal role in the shaping of the ideas and policies that 
were expounded by their groups.  
17 Key members were academic Angelos Angelopoulos, former ambassador Ioannis Politis, 
the young politicians Constantinos Karamanlis, Petros Garoufalias, Georgios Mavros, and 
Petros Kokkalis. 
18 The references here are to Zolotas (1943/2009) and to the draft of the constitution from 
that period that was found in Tsatsos’s archives upon his death in 1987. 
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involved neither extensive nationalizations across all sectors of the economy, nor the 
numerous other forms of interventions that the Greek reformists supported. This is 
particularly true with respect to those from the group that Zolotas and Tsatsos 
headed who became influential and leaned heavily in favour of a State-managed 
economy and society.19 Simply put, in view of the priorities the Americans pursued 
and the difficulties the country faced, these reformists compromised and shelved 
their ideas and plans for later. If there is any doubt about the highly interventionist 
policies they adopted from the high government positions they occupied in the 1950s, 
the following criticisms addressed by Andreas Papandreou (1962) regarding the 
crooked structure of the Greek economy that they established suffice to entertain it:  
 
“There is a pressing need to streamlining the presently cumbersome “sys-
tem” of government regulation of economic activity. In some sense there 
is “too much” government on the Greek economic scene, while there is 
too little research and too little planning, and the organizational apparatus 
for the execution of various plans is practically absent. The mosaic of fis-
cal credit and market regulations which are subject to abrupt changes 
without notice can hardly be expected to encourage private investment ac-
tivity of the right kind” (p. 103). 
 
“Where the market mechanism, the competitive process is allowed to 
perform the resource-allocation task, it ought to be allowed to work. The 
rewards for success should be high – but so should be the penalties for 
failure. The barriers to entry – which in Greece reach unusual heights – 
ought to be lower if not removed. “Saturated” lines of endeavor and 
“closed” professions ought to be exposed to the rigors of the competitive 
process” (p. 104). 
 
“…It is essential to come to understand that an efficient export sector cannot 
be grafted upon an inefficient economy. Greece’s low capacity to export is a 
symptom of structural weakness, of resource misallocation, of missing links 
in the distribution chain – and should be handled as such. Special measures, 
such as preferential credit and fiscal treatment for export-oriented firms, 
while of doubtful effectiveness in the short-run, are often distinctly harmful in 
the long-run” (p. 105).  
 
Such was his dismay that when he came to think about the future of the country in 
the European Economic Community (EEC) he wrote:20 
                                                     
19 Over the period 1950-1990 Zolotas served repeatedly as governor of the central bank, 
capping his career as prime minister in 1989; throughout his public life Tsatsos served as 
parliamentarian, minister and president of the republic; Karamanlis became twice prime 
minister and president of the republic.  
20 Greece became associate member of EEC in June 1961 and full member effectively in 
January 1, 1981. 
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"Greece has recently concluded an Association Agreement with the Euro-
pean Common Market with the prospect of full membership some 22 
years hence. It is fair to say that, given the terms of the association, 
Greece has a small margin of time in which to achieve the structural trans-
formations needed for survival in the European Common Market" (p. 25). 
 
However, when he became head of the Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement in the 1970s 
and prime minister of Greece in the 1980s and 1990s, he spared no effort to push the 
structure of the Greek economy even further away from that needed to survive in the 
EEC, thus committing an awesome inconsistency which is not unrelated to the hellish 
circumstances that hit Greece more recently.21  
 
In the mid-1970s the model of state-managed economy that Zolotas-Tsatsos-
Karamanlis and their associates set up in the 1950s shifted decisively towards state-
socialism. This development assumed the form of a new economic constitution 
which was embedded in the 1975 constitution as their brainchild.22 Since then its 
provisions, revised and supplemented consistently towards more central control, 
moved the structure of the Greek economy opposite  to the direction that was man-
dated both by the advancing globalization of world trade and the 1957 Treaty of 
Rome, the 1986 Single European Market and the 1999 Growth and Stability Pact.  
 
Added protagonists in this trend were Andreas Papandreou,23 Constantinos Simitis, 
Constantinos Karamanlis Jr., Miltiades Evert, etc. and numerous other academics 
and politicians with Keynesian and hard core socialist persuasions. If it is somewhat 
ironic that all these gentlemen at one time or another expressed their concern about 
the need for structural reforms and the possibility that Greece might not survive oth-
erwise in the competitive environment of EEC, never mind. They were politicians and 
many of them are still around managing to no avail Greece’s state of bankruptcy.  
 
Drawing on the above as well as on Bitros (2013) and Thalassinos, Stamatopoulos 
(2015), it is safe to conclude that responsible for the present awful circumstances in 
Greece are the statist policies that were adopted in the post war period. Germany has 
an Ordoliberal economy, whereas Greece has a state-managed economy in which the 
four freedoms of the single European market remain still in abeyance, despite 
Greece’s commitments to the opposite on account of the treaties it has signed with 
EU. The divide in this regard is great and it is not expected to close any time soon.  
 
                                                     
21 Of questionable merit was also the support he lent in the late 1950s as advisor to the Gov-
ernor of the Bank of Greece in the introduction of credit policies in favor of import substi-
tution rather than exports. 
22 Perhaps it is of some importance to add that the 1975 constitution was not approved di-
rectly by the Greek people. It was ratified only by the Greek parliament. 
23 Note that this is the same Andreas Papandreou who wrote the above excerpts in 1962.   
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3. Conceptual Foundations of the Economies in Germany and Greece 
 
The fundamental principles and institutions on which the structure of the German 
economy presently stands had been worked out by Ordoliberal economists already 
before the war. So under Ludwig Erhard in 1949 one task was to embed them in the 
new federal constitution. Thus the constitutional lawyers who wrote it had to abstain 
from inserting provisions of their own which in one way or another would vitiate the 
precepts of an Ordoliberal economy.24 In Greece, there was no such tradition and the 
only restraints felt by the statist constitutional lawyers who wrote the 1952 constitution 
emanated from the views of Keynesian economists in the AMAG. Quite likely this is 
the reason that the 1952 constitution is far less statist than that which was introduced 
in 1975. 
 
The objective in this section is to present the salient characteristics of the models 
that associate with the economic constitutions in Germany and Greece, so as to high-
light their similarities and differences. 
 
3.1 The economic constitution in Germany: Social market economy  
 
The economy in Germany is structured along the lines envisaged by Ordoliberals. In 
particular, it is endowed with a state sector large enough and strong enough to pur-
sue three main objectives. To safeguard that competition reigns across all sectors of 
the economy. To make sure that the distribution of income does not become too 
unequal to threaten social peace; and thirdly to set up and operate a system of public 
goods and of a minimal income guarantee for those who are temporarily or perma-
nently unable to earn a living through the markets. While pursuing these objectives, 
the state is restrained by the obligation to respect two sets of principles, rules or in-
stitutions labelled respectively as “constitutive’ and “regulative”. The constitutive 
principles and their conceptual content have as follows: 
  
1. The principle of competition: The state is obligated to create the institu-
tional conditions that prevent the formation in the markets of monopolies, oligopo-
lies and cartels that inhibit competition and undermine the maximization of social 
welfare.    
2. The principle of private ownership of the means of production: The state 
must not offend through economic policy the private ownership of the means of 
production because all encroachments of property rights reduce the productive po-
tential of the economic system. This does not imply that a regime of private property 
precludes the possibility of state ownership. If for some well-documented reasons 
the state gets involved in the production and distribution of goods and services, 
state-enterprises should be open to competition.   
                                                     
24 According to Hasse (2017, 97), the climate was even more favorable because: “Due to the 
intense collaboration between economists and lawyers inside the Freiburg School the dif-
fering tasks could be successfully solved and institutions designed.” 
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3. The principle of a stable monetary system: This mandates monetary policy 
to be conducted so as to achieve stability in the general price level. For this result, 
the monetary system must operate automatically, i.e. without discretion on the part 
of monetary authorities. The reason being that deliberate interventions lead monetary 
authorities to wrong decisions, thereby maximizing the risk of inflation or deflation.  
4. The principle of open markets: Introducing price and non-price barriers to 
markets by either the state or private parties should be prohibited. All kinds of pres-
sure groups are interested in closing markets to realize gains by limiting competition. 
For this reason imposing high tariffs and import quotas to protect specific domestic 
producers, allowing professional and trade associations to collude and close the 
markets in which their members offer their services, and necessitating by the state of 
excessive and unwarranted formalities for doing business reduce the efficiency of 
domestic producers, and hence, such practices should be forbidden.  
5. The principle of freedom of contract: Competition in markets develops 
when individuals and businesses can exchange rights they own over goods and ser-
vices. Hence, private and state agents in the economy should be able to contract 
freely, but within the limits set by the laws. Such limits may, for example, forbid 
contracting to establish a cartel in a given market or to buy and sell substances dan-
gerous to the general public.   
6. The principle of accountability: In a competition based economy those who 
stand to gain from participating in free exchanges must bear also the losses from 
their actions. Expressed differently, those economic agents who make losses from 
their decisions should not be allowed to shift their losses to third parties. This re-
quirement increases individual responsibility across the board and forces all partici-
pants in the economy to be extra careful with the use of the resources under their 
control. For example, an investment is undertaken more carefully, the more account-
able the responsible person for the investment is. In other words, accountability acts 
as a deterrent against undertaking risky dealings with capital and enforces careful 
checking of markets.   
7.  The principle of consistency and stability of economic policies: Economic 
policies are intended to smooth out disturbances that develop in markets because of 
natural and man-made domestic and international events. For example, a flood that 
destroys a great deal of the agricultural production of wheat is bound to create a lot 
of shocks on the supply side of products based on wheat. The economic policies that 
will be adopted to confront the shocks should be time consistent and stable. Time 
consistency requires the policy makers to act as they announce over time, whereas 
the property of stability requires policy makers to stay the course so that economic 
agents may form reliable expectations.   
 
 If properly applied, the seven “constitutive” principles outlined above give rise to a 
free market competitive economy, which is consistent with a democratic political 
order and most efficient in terms of the resources used per unit output produced. But 
aside from these highly desirable institutional guidelines, in real life there arise cer-
tain allocative problems that need to be addressed and here is where the “regulative” 
principles come into force. These are the following:  
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1. The problem of monopoly: For liberals in general the concentration of 
economic power is undesirable for two main reasons. First, because in free markets 
it results in elevated prices and less than socially optimal supplies of goods and ser-
vices, and, second, because in politics it places the state authorities at a disad-
vantage, leading frequently to their capture and the introduction of arrangements that 
hurt the general public. To prevent undue concentrations of economic power and 
control the antisocial practices thereof, democracies have developed panoply of 
competition and antitrust laws, as well as particular institutions to enforce them. This 
is true also in Germany, where concentration across all markets in the economy is 
not allowed to exceed 40%.   
2. Income and social policies: In a free market economy, the price mechanism 
allocates the incomes to the contributing economic agents after production and ex-
change has been completed. The demand for goods and services by those who re-
ceive incomes determines what will be produced and in what quantities. As a result, 
the incomes from wages, interest and profits are inevitably determined by those who 
earn them, and hence the distribution of the national income is based solely on per-
formance criteria. But then, according to Alfred Müller-Armack and others, while 
some classes of the population may enjoy all the luxuries in life, some other classes 
may be unable to secure even the mere necessities, thus creating conditions for so-
cial unrest. In view of this criticism Ordoliberals in general agreed that the state has 
an obligation to provide those who cannot earn a living through markets a minimum 
guarantee income. However, in more recent years it is widely recognized that the 
income and other social policies that have been adopted are excessive because they 
have transformed Germany into an advanced welfare state with all the drawbacks 
that this development entails regarding incentives for work, saving and entrepreneur-
ial risk taking.   
3. The problem of the environment: In certain cases, even when the price 
mechanism functions appropriately, the cost of resources is not reckoned accurately 
because certain production and consumption activities generate positive or negative 
externalities. For example, when an electric utility generates electricity by burning 
coal, it is possible that the electricity is under-priced because the utility does not 
include in its production cost the smoke and the other pollutants that it emits to the 
environment. In such cases economists generally agree that the state should inter-
vene so as to force producers and consumers to include in their calculations the im-
pact of their decisions, positive or negative, on the environment. The tension be-
tween the calculations of economic agents and the public interest can be seen also in 
the social area. In the past, child labour, long working hours, insufficient safety in 
the enterprises, etc. harmed employees and such dangers were not confronted until 
the state intervened and imposed codes of safety in the working environment. 
4. Abnormal behaviour in the supply of labour: Eucken argued that under cer-
tain circumstances the supply of labour might be inversely related to the wage rate. 
By this he meant that, if workers aim at a certain income, as the wage rate declines 
workers would be willing to offer more labour, thus pushing the wage rate further 
downwards. On this ground, he recommended that a feasible policy would be for the 
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state to step in and introduce a minimum wage so as to stabilize the labour market. 
More recent studies have shown that the dynamics of labour markets are more com-
plicated and that raising the minimum wage may hurt workers, particularly those 
who lose their jobs and those who are unemployed. But this policy is now of general 
appeal.   
 
To summarize, Germany’s economic constitution is based on two pillars. That is, on 
a set of seven “constitutive” principles, which aim at establishing a competition 
based economy, and on another set of four “regulative” principles, which aim at 
confronting four types of possible market failures. According to Hasse (2017, 105) a 
trend has emerged more recently in favor of incorporating into the economic consti-
tution several more principles. For example, under the label Principles for Govern-
ments one is the Principle to control and restrain the influence of interest groups. 
From these suggestions it follows that, as circumstances evolve, the model of social 
market economy is enriched with more institutions that seek to safeguard its funda-
mental tenets. 
 
3.2 The economic constitution in Greece: State-managed economy   
 
After Greece went bankrupt in 2009, international creditors offered to bail her out on 
the basis of an agreement signed in 2010 according to which Greece would undertake 
reforms in two main fronts. First, to enforce policies leading eventually to public 
budget surpluses, so that the huge public debt might start someday to decline as a per-
centage of GDP, and secondly,  to reset the product and labor markets in the direction 
of competition and the four freedoms mandated by the single European market.25 In-
cluded in the reforms was also an extensive package of privatizations. That agreement 
was followed by a second one in 2012 and another in 2015 that runs until 2018.  
 
Yet, despite the progress that has been accomplished so far regarding fiscal adjust-
ment, primarily by raising taxes, progress in the fronts of structural reforms and privat-
izations is lagging seriously because conservative and leftist governments have been 
unwilling to take ownership. The fundamental reason is that Greek governments and 
the citizens who vote for them are prisoners of their own statist thinking and institu-
tional arrangements, which have led to the formation of powerful interest groups that 
protect the status quo even under the present ominous national circumstances.26  
                                                     
25 It is hardly necessary to stress that Greece not only has avoided introducing and enforcing 
policies in these directions but with a few exceptions since it signed the treaty for the single 
European market it has adopted systematically arrangements in favor of extending gov-
ernment controls in the economy. 
26Very illuminating in this regard is the assessment by Miller and Cleverley (2011, 47) who 
write: 
“… After the war, Greece packed five hundred years of Western develop-
ment into five decades. Government after government attempted to break 
traditions of paternalistic politics and economic corruption, while offering 
          Germany and Greece: A Mapping of their Great Divide and its EU Implications 
 
 30  
 
 
How things came to this unhappy outcome is not difficult to summarize. In the two 
decades leading to the 1952 constitution, the organization of the Greek economy was 
becoming more and more statist. Administrative and other price controls prevented 
markets from bringing the supply and demand of goods and services into alignment, 
thus creating artificial surpluses and shortages.  By administrative arrangements the 
state controlled the flow of investment in and out of the various productive sectors.  
 
The number of public organizations and enterprises was expanding rapidly. Through 
direct and indirect channels the banking system served as extension and accessory of 
state power in the economy. Key classes of professionals like doctors, lawyers and 
notaries organized into professional societies aiming, among other terms, at control-
ling the flow of new members into their ranks and fixing the rates of their remunera-
tion in agreement with the state, so as to maximize their rents.27  
 
Consecutive governments, instead of letting the civil service cater to the needs of 
citizens, treated public sector employment as a mechanism mainly for extending pat-
ronage to their voters and secondarily to alleviate the extensive unemployment that the 
central management of the economy generated. With such arrangements in place and 
the hard core statist views that prevailed among politicians and economists, the 1952 
constitution was conspicuously fuzzy regarding the nature of the economic organiza-
tion envisaged by its authors. For example, while on the one hand the constitution 
vouched for the freedom of association (Article 11) and the protection of property 
rights (Article 17, paragraph 1), on the other it opened wide avenues of intervention by 
placing agricultural and urban cooperatives (Article 109) under the auspices of the 
state and by allowing forced expropriations of large agricultural farms and properties 
(Article 104). Perhaps because of the presence of the Americans and the pressing 
needs for assistance, constitutional lawmakers chose to ignore the advancing state 
management of the economy and left for later the articulation in the constitution of the 
economic order they had in mind.28  
 
The opportunity for this arose right after the fall of the military dictatorship in 1974 
and the return to power of the same people who had shaped the developments in the 
                                                                                                                                         
Greeks the functioning political-economic infrastructure that other West-
ern Europeans enjoyed.” 
27  It should be noted that these professional societies hold their own elections (in the style of 
parliamentary elections) and are governed by groups aligned with political parties. Fur-
thermore, as with trade unions, by trying to achieve optimal outcomes for their members 
with respect to a tradeoff between wages and employment (causing some unemployment), 
professional societies create similar inefficiencies. 
28 Judging from the views they expressed in the 1930s and 1940s, the politicians and econo-
mists who came to prominence afterwards did not change their ideological convictions and 
persuasions. This we know from the statement of Constantinos Karamanlis in the 1970s 
about his adherence to socialist thinking, the editor’s introduction to the 2nd edition of the 
book by Zolotas (1943/2009), and the details given by Angelopoulos (1992). 
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1950s and early 1960s.29 In view of the bitter experiences during the dictatorship and 
the need for a new start in democratic politics, the government of Constantinos Ka-
ramanlis decided to draft a new constitution, which was proposed and ratified by the 
Greek parliament in 1975. Not unexpectedly the economic constitution embedded in 
it is a prototype for a state-managed economy. It is founded on the following main 
principles: 
   
1. The principle of cooperation: Given that the market mechanism is based on 
competition, by its very nature it promotes the animal spirits of citizens, it 
contributes to inequality by allowing some people to take advantage of 
others, and it erodes social cohesion. Thus, irrespective of its economic ef-
ficiency, the state has the obligation to replace it by institutions of coopera-
tion and to allow competition only in those narrow productive activities in 
which individual initiative and energies are irreplaceable.  
2. The principle of central planning: According to Article 106, paragraph 1, for 
the purpose of establishing “social peace” and promoting “public interest”, 
the state plans and coordinates economic activities in the country. Through 
planning the state pursues: (a) the economic development of all sectors of 
the economy by adopting appropriate measures for the exploitation of 
sources of national wealth in the atmosphere, in underground and underwa-
ter deposits, and (b) the regional development, particularly of mountainous 
and islandic regions. Articles 79, paragraph 8, mandates that development 
plans are authorized by the full body of the parliament.                                                     
3. The principle of socially delimited property rights: Although by Article 17, 
paragraphs 1, property owners are assured of their unalienable rights, by 
the provisions stated in Article 106, paragraph 2, they are forbidden to use 
it in ways that may insult human liberty and dignity, or cause harm to the 
national economy. But since the latter terms are indeterminate, property 
owners cannot know in advance what uses of their property might entail 
such offences of the law. Therefore, property rights have been seriously 
curtailed by imposing on them litmus tests and numerous other hurdles.  
4. The principle of the state’s autonomy: The state is an autonomous legal au-
thority with rights that take precedent over those of other legal entities and 
individuals. As such it has prerogatives over all matters of life and death of 
citizens. Consequently, the state is entitled to intervene in the private af-
fairs as it deems pertinent. In this spirit the state’s actual and potential in-
terventions are innumerable. A few indicative examples are the following:  
a. With Article 16, paragraphs 5 and 8, the state retains exclusive monopo-
ly rights over higher education. On this basis, higher education is man-
aged as a centrally planned and administered system with all fundamen-
tal decisions taken by the Ministry of Education and applied with lim-
                                                     
29 Τhis was the first “socialist phase” of Karamanlis governments. The second phase took 
place in the years 1974-1981. An excellent source of information regarding the way the 
economy was managed by the state during these decades is Halikias (1978). 
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ited discretion by the universities. As for the nature of higher education 
this is defined as a public good, but it hardly offered as such.    
b. Article 12, paragraph 6, allows the state to establish so-called “compulso-
ry associations of individuals for the public interest.” This constitutes a se-
rious limitation of individual liberties as well as of competition because 
licensed professionals cannot offer their services to the public without 
participating in such associations and applying the recommended rates for 
their services. Moreover, their number is large and they are spread widely 
across various economic sectors. 
c. Article 106, paragraph 3, provides the right of the state to nationalize or 
forcefully participate in any enterprise it deems appropriate for several 
reasons that are subsumed under the so-called “national interest”. This 
particular right was invoked in the 1970s to nationalize several business 
concerns including the big Andreades Conglomerate of manufacturing, 
banking, shipbuilding and other companies.  
5. The principle of social rights: In its autonomy and benevolence the state 
grants and guarantees rights over and above those subsumed under the label 
of “natural rights”. For distinction these rights are called “social rights”. The 
following list represents a sample from those which are explicitly referred to 
in the 1975 constitution: 
a. All Greeks have a right to education free of charge at all levels in state 
schools and universities (Article 16, paragraph 4). 
b. The state provides free of charge health services to all citizens and espe-
cially to those who are impotent and in old age. Also, the state looks after 
all citizens who lack sufficient housing (Article 21). 
c. Every citizen has a right to employment and to remuneration equal to the 
value of the work offered (Article 22, paragraph 1). 
d. The state takes care of the social insurance of workers (Article 22, para-
graph 4). 
e. Subject to the restrictions mentioned, all workers have a right to strike but 
only if they exercise it through the legally constituted labour unions (Arti-
cle 23, paragraph 2).30  
 
Associated with the “social rights” are two qualifications. Namely, first, that it is for-
bidden for citizens to make excessive use of them (Article 25, paragraph 3), and sec-
ond, that the state has the right to demand that citizens abide by their social and na-
tional allegiance (Article 25, paragraph 4).  
      
Moreover, the above principles are supplemented with certain state functions which 
address key issues like the following: 
                                                     
30 From an economic analysis point of view there is a gross contradiction between the provi-
sion of equal pay for equal work (article 22, paragraph 1) and the right based on this pro-
vision, because labor unions negotiate for maximizing the wages not of everybody but ex-
clusively of  their own members. For this point I am indebted to Dr. Steve Bakalis. 
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1. Control of radio frequency based mass media: Article 15, paragraph, 2, 
places the transmission of news, pictures and information through radio 
and television under the direct control of the state. The main objective in 
this arrangement is for the state to secure on behalf of the citizens the terms 
of operation that meet the social mission of these media.  
2. Protection of the natural and cultural environment: The authorization for 
the state’s initiatives in these areas is provided by Article 24, paragraphs 
1&6. The policies that may be used for this purpose are preventive and 
suppressive and in the case of public forests exceptions can be allowed on-
ly if they are justified on account of the public interest.  
3. City planning and restructuring: When it comes to the establishment of new 
cities or the rearrangement of existing ones, the state retains exceptionally 
wide discretionary powers to intervene, frequently at the cost of the land 
owners themselves. Relevant to these functions is Article 24, paragraphs 2-5. 
 
On applying these provisions, the expectation was that there would result an econo-
my with a large public sector and a smaller state-controlled private sector. The pub-
lic sector would perform productive and distributive tasks. For example, through 
public enterprises and organizations, it would take the lead in the production of 
goods and services well beyond those that fall in the category of public goods; it 
would act as buffer for absorbing various shocks in the employment of workers; it 
would serve as a supplementary income redistribution mechanism through the pric-
ing of public services, etc. etc. As for the private sector, this would be directed 
through the state-controlled banking system to activities consistent with the objec-
tives of the central planners. Thus, in line with its top-down design, the economy 
that has emerged is a least competitive centrally managed state economy. 
 
4. Assessment  
 
From sections 2 and 3 it follows that right after the war a group of distinguished 
leaders took it upon themselves to rebuild Germany on the basis of the model of the 
“Social Market Economy”, whereas the hearts, the minds and the choices of their 
counterparts in Greece were fixed on establishing a “State-managed Economy”. In 
view of the participation of Greece in the unification process of Europe and the obli-
gations it undertook to fulfil in the various stages, one would have expected that this 
great divide would have closed or at least diminished. For example, under the pres-
sures to become from an associate member in the 1960s a full member in the early 
1980s, one would have expected that all the distortions mentioned earlier in the quota-
tions from Papandreou’s (1962)  book would have been confronted and that, having 
fulfilled its obligations under the Treaty of Rome, Greece would have become compet-
itive enough to integrate into the community of European nations on its own strengths 
and merits without other considerations.  Nothing of this sort happened and the 1975 
economic constitution paved the way for the great divide to widen even further. The 
reasons for this are not hard to explain.  
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As it happened in the USA, the UK and elsewhere, the rapid spread of Keynesian ideas 
and policies in Germany in the 1960 and 1970s forced Ordoliberalism to retreat. But 
from the 1980s on, due partly to the failure of Keynesian policies to deal with stagflation 
and partly because of the uprising in the neoliberal ideas and policies, statism in Germa-
ny was contained and started to retreat in favour of the four European freedoms that 
became in 1986 the basis of the Single European Market. The following quotations 
from two observers standing ten years apart give us a glimpse into how far this trans-
formation has advanced and the likely direction of trends in the coming years: 
 
“…the political conditions for a nascent resurgence of Ordoliberal pol-
icy may currently exist. Recent developments, namely the formation of 
Germany’s second “Grand Coalition” between the SPD and CDU/CSU 
in 2005, broker intriguing possibilities. Recalling the first Grand Coali-
tion’s decisive role in implementing Karl Schiller’s31 Keynesian eco-
nomic ideas, it is conceivable that given effective leadership and a 
well-articulated vision (both of which are conspicuously lacking) the 
current party formation might marshal the political legitimacy neces-
sary for a sweeping overhaul of the defunct Keynesian state. Wishful 
thinking or historical conceit, perhaps, but a provocative hypothetical 
nevertheless. Policymakers should think big, a new “Sprung ins kalte 
Wasser,” and redefine an economic and social platform that is motivated 
by market competitiveness, price stability and limited, non-discretionary 
government intervention. Recent history confirms this program not as an 
“Anglo-Saxon invasion,” but the fruition of a previously successful 
German academic movement.” (Rittershausen, 2007, 48) 
 
“In Germany we have a vivid discussion about the erosion of Social 
Market Economy by many political decisions. On the other hand in 
those discussions the rules and principles of Social Market Economy 
are again and again taken as yardsticks. And – above all – the institu-
tional arrangements for the economy and the society are backbones of 
stability. Moreover, even if political decisions are obvious deviations 
of Social Market Economy – when the results were unfavourable they 
normally are changed in the direction of the principles of Social Mar-
ket Economy.”(Hasse, 2017, 104)  
 
Drawing on these assessments, the preponderant likelihood is that the current status 
quo will not change much in the foreseeable future. The Ordoliberal principles will 
continue to serve as guides and reforms towards the “market” and away from the “so-
                                                     
31 Initially as an academic and later on as an academic-turn-politician Karl Shiller by most 
accounts was instrumental in the adoption of Keynesian ideas and policies by the SPD. 
However, Hasse et al. (2008, 65-66) have found considerable evidence to include him also 
among the significant contributors to Ordoliberalism.   
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cial” components of the “Social Market Economy” will become more frequent and 
more decisive, particularly if the European experiment survives its current troubles.   
 
Unlike Germany, in the post-war period Greece went through consecutive waves of 
socialism. The first one coincides with the 1955-1963 governments of Constantinos 
Karamanlis. Found together in the top positions of power Karamanlis-Tsatsos-
Zolotas pushed the tentacles of the state in all directions. Through credit controls 
practically they nationalized the banking system and enabled themselves through the 
so-called “annual monetary program” to direct highly subsidized investments in 
those sectors and activities that the technocrats of the Bank of Greece deemed as 
most dynamic. Through generalized price controls, including foreign exchange, they 
twisted the price system so as to achieve the annual monetary targets they set, and 
hence price stability at around 2% inflation.  
 
Through heavy public investment they enlarged the wider public sector, thus secur-
ing the necessary institutional and industrial infrastructures, but also alleviating the 
rampant unemployment by overmanning public organizations and enterprises, etc. 
etc. If one wonders why the Greek economy did not perform less miraculously than 
the German economy in the period prior to the mid-1970s, 32 this is the best explana-
tion that comes to mind. All centrally managed systems perform initially well until 
they amass enough entropy to implode. The same happened with all socialist Eastern 
Europe countries and this is the reason why they have only bad memories of those 
experiences.  
 
The second wave of socialism came in the period 1975- 1985 under governments 
initially by Karamanlis and afterwards by Papandreou, whose Pan-Hellenic Socialist 
Movement won the 1981 elections on a platform which included the commitment to 
take Greece down the road to the “Socialism of the third way.” In the second half of 
the 1970s, the trio of Karamanlis-Tsatsos-Zolotas set to conclude their plan.  No 
sooner had the 1975 constitution been voted in and the government of Karamanlis in 
quick succession nationalized a few big banks and large enterprises and introduced 
numerous structural reforms in the older statist tradition. As these policies were 
adopted by a supposedly conservative government, they were perceived by business 
people as “regime change” and, given that the main opposition party in the parlia-
ment promised more of the same, they started to act analogously. Total and private 
investment as percentages of GDP went into a long term downward trend. Foreign 
companies began to leave Greece and Greek companies to relocate in neighbouring 
countries. Unemployment climbed rapidly. The deficits in the balance of payments 
begun to contribute increasingly to borrowing from abroad; and in general Greece’s 
                                                     
32 During the period 1954-1974 Greece achieved: high economic growth rates (≈ 7%), envi-
able price stability (<2.5%), which enhanced the international competitiveness of Greek 
products and services and maintained the balance of payments under manageable control, 
enviable reduction of unemployment (<2.5%), improvement and expansion of social ser-
vices, and all this with very limited public debt (<12.5% of GDP in 1974).  
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annual average rate of growth trended significantly lower than in the pre-1974 peri-
od.33 If on top of the above we reckon that after 1974, and especially after 1981, 
Greek governments undermined with their policies the ability of the country to sur-
vive within the competitive EU environment, Greece’s decline was all but certain. 
 
The  laxity with which EU leaders and institutions treated Greece with regard to the 
fulfilment of her obligations created “Moral Hazard” issues throughout Europe and 
as such it has been  severely criticized. For example,  Bitros (2015, 7 ) writes: 
 
When the European Commission “froze” the Association Agreement in 
1967 reacting to the imposition of military rule in Greece, the message 
was clear and loud: It stressed the commitment of the EU to democra-
cy, and, by doing so, it created a precedent for all European nations 
with aspirations similar to those of Greece. Yet, after the restoration of 
Democracy in 1974 and the re-activation of the Association Agree-
ment, the European authorities failed to notice that the institutional 
changes in Greece were inconsistent with the main pillars of the Treaty 
of Rome. Let me explain:  Bitros and Karayiannis (2013) establish that 
Democracy is impossible to take root and flourish without a free mar-
ket economy. Quite expectedly this finding explains why the founding 
fathers of the EU constructed the Treaty of Rome on the twin pillars of 
democracy and the free market economy. However, the institutional 
changes in Greece, particularly after 1974, worsened its structural im-
balances even further than in 1961.  
 
Unfortunately, EU authorities continued to look the other way ever since. For exam-
ple they raised no eyebrows when in the early 1980s Papandreou’s government set 
up a state subsidized scheme to save long defunct industrial enterprises. They did not 
raise hell when government after government procrastinated and adopted policies 
moving the Greek economy away from the four European freedoms; and even now 
in a period of extreme hardship for the Greek people they pay leap service to the 
European Project by allowing Greek governments to maintain almost intact the cen-
tral administration of the economy.  
 
There is some light though at the end of the tunnel. This emanates from the unrelenting 
demolition by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) of the 1975 economic constitu-
tion. Under the threat of an open bankruptcy, gone are the national and sectoral labour 
agreements. In are the enterprise labour contracts. Gone are the various impediments to 
employee lay-offs. In are all sorts of flexible labour market arrangements. Perhaps, if 
                                                     
33 After 1974, the average annual growth rate fell to about one third (≈ 2.4%), the unem-
ployment rate, which more than doubled in the period 1980-2000 (≈ 6%), in the decade of 
2000 nearly quadrupled (≈ 9%), the explosive deficits in the balance of payment were con-
tained only thanks to the huge EU aid, and the budget deficits pushed public debt to an un-
sustainable ratio (≈ 150% of the GDP in 2011). 
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and when all structural reforms which have been recommended by the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) are implemented the great divide 
with Germany will start to close and robust and sustainable economic growth will return 
for good in Greece, together with the four freedoms of the single European market. 
  
5. Implications for the future of the EU  
 
One great ambition of the founding fathers of the EU was that someday member-
states would enjoy roughly comparable living standards (Allegret et al., 2016; 
Boldeanu and Tache, 2016). As all were expected to grow at about the same speed, 
no member-state would be left behind and those who entered with a handicap would 
be assisted to catch up. This benevolent idea became in turn the basis for the estab-
lishment of the so-called European structural funds, which were assigned the task to 
assist laggard member-states to streamline their economies so as to raise their 
growth rates. Unfortunately, the assistance from the structural funds and the other 
EU facilities proved ineffective in this regard and more recently the EU political 
leaders were forced to start thinking about an EU in which member-states would 
grow at their own speeds.  
 
This development is important because it reveals the hard way that top-down ap-
proaches to smoothing differences among nations do not work when differences are 
path dependent and spring mostly from their systems of values, educational back-
grounds, preferences, ideological inclinations, and even climate dispositions. Over 
the period 1981-2010 it is estimated that Greece received from EU net financial as-
sistant amounting on the average to about 2.7% of GDP per annum. This was an 
exceedingly generous assistance and proves the true allegiance of European nations 
to a less developed member-state. But Greece abrogated its main treaty obligations, 
it resisted systematically all pressures for restructuring so as to converge to the Eu-
ropean economies and in fact it chose and applied an economic constitution totally 
inconsistent with the principles of a normal market economy. As a result, in those 
indices that matter most it has diverged rather than converged and this would have 
happened irrespective of the amount of assistance.   
 
What can we learn from the case of Greece which would be useful for the future of 
EU? One lesson is that the emphasis of convergence must switch from indices of 
economic performance to indices of achievements in the four European freedoms 
For, if member-states are in the EU for the ideas and the life-styles it represents, then 
the differences that count are not in the living standards, but in the degrees to which 
the four freedoms take hold across the Euroland; and, also, because faster progress in 
the four freedoms, aside from precipitating the convergence in per-capita incomes 
and other indices of material well-being, will smooth out differences in politics by 
reducing the democratic deficit in the EU.  
 
Another lesson is that member-states should be held more closely accountable for 
conforming to the terms of the European treaties. This implies that existing Europe-
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an institutions have proved ineffective and that there is now need for reforms in two 
directions: First, to improve monitoring and enforcement, particularly in the imple-
mentation of the four freedoms; and, second, to do so not by expanding the central 
bureaucracy in Brussels but by intelligent mechanisms design and implementation. 
A last lesson, but not least, is that the structural funds may be expected to become 
more effective in the realization of the European unification if they switch from sub-
sidizing projects for economic convergence to projects aspiring to enhancing one or 
more of the four freedoms. 
 
In short, if there is a single lesson to be learnt from Greece that would be useful for 
the future of Europe, this is that European unification depends far more in the wid-
ening and deepening of the four European freedoms than in any measure of conver-
gence in living standards (Thalassinos et al., 2015). This is not to say that the latter 
criterion is not important. But certainly it is of secondary order.  
  
6. Summary of findings and conclusions 
 
In the last four decades Greece received from the EU not less than 180 billion Euros 
of net financial assistance. On a per capita basis this amounts to an unprecedented 
inflow of aid by world standards. Moreover, these funds were used under the moni-
toring and watchful eyes of the European agencies and institutions. Yet in 2009 
Greece went bankrupt and had to be bailed out by its international and European 
creditors with terrible hardships for the Greek people. Something has gone terribly 
wrong which has led me to search for the reasons and in view of the findings to sug-
gest possible actions and policies for getting out of this quagmire. 
 
In this paper I focused my attention on a detailed comparison of the roots and the 
evolution of the economic constitutions that applied in Germany and Greece in the 
post-war period. Given that from its inception the EU has been founded on treaties 
that incorporate ideas and policy directions from the German economic order, my 
hunch was that, if the economic constitution in Greece has diverged from that in 
Germany, the structure of the Greek economy would have diverged all this time 
from EU fundamentals and this might have contributed significantly to its bankruptcy. 
The findings that have emerged from this comparison are straightforward. Whereas 
the four European freedoms are in line with the German essentially Ordoliberal eco-
nomic order, the economic constitution in Greece has promoted a state-managed 
economy. This is the great divide which certainly has contributed to the bankruptcy of 
Greece and explains thoroughly why she refuses to take ownership of the necessary 
reforms so as to return quickly to a path of robust economic growth. 
 
The implications of these findings for the EU are also straightforward. In particular, 
emphasis from economic convergence should be replaced by emphasis on the four 
European freedoms; monitoring and enforcement of EU treaties should be reinforced 
by relying more on automatic mechanisms and less on bureaucratic man-driven pro-
cesses, and the nature of projects financed by the structural funds should be com-
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pletely overhauled in the direction of subsidizing projects that enhance the realiza-
tion of the fundamental EU freedoms. 
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Appendix: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Select sample of  economic indicators for Greece and Germany  
 
Year 2015 Greece Germany 
GDP per capita (EUR) 17117 33869 
GDP growth (%) -0.23 1.45 
GDP gap1 -6.57 -0.11 
Investment  (% of GDP) 9.83 18.83 
Inflation (% of annual change) -1.09 0.14 
Unemployment (% of the labor force)  25 4.63 
Imports of goods and services (% change) -5.77 5.83 
Exports of goods and services (% change) -7.94 5.39 
General government revenues (% of GDP) 45.77 44.61  
General government outlays (% of GDP) 49.99 43.97 
Government debt to GDP (%) 177.0 71.2 
Private debt to GDP (%) 140.0 150.0 
Wage per month (EUR) 1116 3624 
Personal income tax rate (%) 48.0 47.5 
Corporate tax rate (%) 29.0 29.65 
Notes: 
1. The GDP gap measures the unused productive capacity of the economy. In Greece it is 
so high because of the prevailing recession. 
 
Sources: 
http://www.economywatch.com/economic-statistics/country/ 
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/country/indicators 
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Table 2: Quality of institutions and governance in the year 2015 
 
Governance Score 
Government 
Effectiveness1 
Regulatory  
Quality2 
Rule of 
Law3 
Control of 
Corruption4 
Germany  1.74 1.67 1.78 1.82 
Greece 0.25 0.40 0.24 –0.13 
Notes: 
1. Government Effectiveness (GE) reflects perceptions of the quality of public services; 
the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pres-
sures; the quality of policy formulation and implementation; and the credibility of the 
government's commitment to such policies. 
2. Regulatory Quality: Regulatory quality captures perceptions of the ability of the gov-
ernment to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and 
promote private sector development. This table lists the individual variables from each 
data sources used to construct this measure in the Worldwide Governance Indicators 
3. Rule of Law: reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and 
abide by the rules of society, in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property 
rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. 
4. Control of Corruption: reflects perceptions of the extent to which public power is exer-
cised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 
“capture” of the state by elites and private interests. 
 
Source:  
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports  
 
  
